From Debtors’ Prisons to Prisoner Debtors: Credit Counseling for the Incarcerated by Bartell, Laura B.
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-2008
From Debtors’ Prisons to Prisoner Debtors: Credit
Counseling for the Incarcerated
Laura B. Bartell
Wayne State University, l.bartell@wayne.edu
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Laura B. Bartell, From Debtors’ Prisons to Prisoner Debtors: Credit Counseling for the Incarcerated, 24 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 15 (2008).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/183
ARTICLES
FROM DEBTORS' PRISONS TO PRISONER DEBTORS:
CREDIT COUNSELING FOR THE INCARCERATED
Laura B. Bartell*
The degradations endured by those unable to satisfy their creditors,
imposed by English law prior to the middle of the nineteenth century, have
I 2been described by the authors of the time,' and decried by modem scholars.
Although debtors no longer suffer imprisonment because of their failure to pay
their debts, the modem prisoner may still be in no position to satisfy his or her
creditors. As a result, those who are incarcerated may seek relief from their
debts through a bankruptcy case.
In most respects the Bankruptcy Code 3 (the "Code") purports to treat
prisoners like any other prospective debtor seeking relief from his or her
financial obligations. However, application of its ostensibly-neutral provisions
has increasingly burdened prisoners attempting to take advantage of those
provisions because of their lack of personal autonomy during the period of
their imprisonment. In some cases, prisoners have been completely denied
access to bankruptcy, despite the absence of any indication that Congress
intended such a result.
In this Article I will discuss the new credit counseling requirements in the
Code, and how they make it difficult, or even impossible, for imprisoned
debtors to get bankruptcy relief due to their incarceration. First, I will examine
the new requirements for pre-filing credit counseling and post-filing personal
financial management courses. Then I will describe how those provisions have
Professor of Law at Wayne State University Law School.
See, e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, LITTLE DORRIT 79-89 (Everyman's Library ed., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
1992) (1855-56).
2 See, e.g., Jayne S. Ressler, Civil Contempt Confinement and the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and
Consumer Protection Act of 2005: An Examination of Debtor Incarceration in the Modem Age, 37 RUTGERS
L.J. 355, 358-63 (2006).
3 11 U.S.C.§ 101-1527(2000).
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been applied to debtors who were incarcerated at the time of their bankruptcy
case. Finally, I will suggest that courts retain discretion to interpret the
provisions, and even to waive them, by declining to dismiss a case in which the
debtor was unable to comply with the new provisions. I believe that courts
should do so when necessary to ensure that inmates retain the protection of the
Bankruptcy Code.
1. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR CREDIT COUNSELING
Section 109 sets forth the eligibility criteria for being a debtor under the
Code.4 For individual debtors, the principal requirement is that he or she
"reside[] or [have] a domicile, a place of business, or property in the United
5 6States." There are special requirements for a debtor under chapter 13, who
must be an "individual with regular income" within the meaning of § 101(30). 7
Because prisoners often do not meet this requirement during the term of their
imprisonment, they are frequently ineligible for chapter 13 bankruptcy (unless
their spouses have income). 8  However, because prisoners are not likely to
have significant "current monthly income[J" 9 if they file a chapter 7 petition,
in most cases, they will not be subject to a motion to dismiss for abuse under
the new "means-testing" provisions of § 707(b).10
But can a prisoner take advantage of chapter 7 or chapter 13? The new
credit counseling requirements, and their limited exceptions, make it especially
difficult for these prospective debtors.
4 Id. § 109. All references in this Article to "section" are intended to refer to sections of the Code.
I d. § 109(a).
6 Id. § 109(e).
7 Id. § 101(30).
8 See, e.g., In re Crowder, 179 B.R. 571, 574 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1995); In re Sloan, 66 B.R. 567, 568
(Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
9 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(10A) (West 2007).
10 Under § 707(b)(2) (commonly referred to as the "means-testing" provisions), a chapter 7 bankruptcy
petition is presumed to be an abuse of the provisions of the Code if the debtor's current monthly income,
reduced by certain specified expenses, and "multiplied by 60 is not less than the lesser of' (I) the greater of
"25 percent of the debtor's nonpriority unsecured claims... or $6,575. . . or (II) $10,950" (those dollar figures
having been adjusted as of April 1, 2007 and subject to adjustment every three years thereafter under § 104).
Id. § 707(b)(2) (2007). The debtor may rebut the presumption of abuse only by showing "special
circumstances that justify additional expenses or adjustments of current monthly income for which there is no
reasonable alternative," id. § 707(b)(2)(B)(I), and which cause the debtor to pass the "means test." Id.
§ 707(b)(2)(B)(iv). If the debtor's and debtor's spouse's current monthly income, multiplied by twelve, is not
more than the "highest median family income of the applicable State" for a family of the same number of
individuals, no judge, trustee, or other party in interest may bring a motion to dismiss a chapter 7 case under
the means-testing provisions. Id. § 707(b)(7)(A).
[Vol. 24
CREDIT COUNSELING FOR THE INCARCERATED
A. Prepetition Credit Counseling
Under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2005 ("BAPCPA")," Congress added a new section, § 109(h), which states
that no individual may be a debtor under the Code without receiving credit
counseling from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency
within 180 days prior to the date of filing.' 2 The ostensible reason for this new
requirement was to ensure that the prospective debtor "will make an informed
choice about bankruptcy, its alternatives, and consequences."' 3  Among the
consequences is "the potentially devastating effect [bankruptcy] can have on
their credit rating."14
A debtor demonstrates that he or she has complied with this new eligibility
condition by filing
(1) a certificate from the approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agency that provided the debtor services under section
109(h) describing the services provided to the debtor; and (2) a copy
'l Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
12 Section 109(h)(1) reads as follows:
Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3), and notwithstanding any other provisions of this section, an
individual may not be a debtor under this title unless such individual has, during the 180-day
period preceding the date of filing of the petition by such individual, received from an approved
nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency described in section 11 (a) an individual or group
briefing (including a briefing conducted by telephone or on the Intemet) that outlined the
opportunities for available credit counseling and assisted such individual in performing a related
budget analysis.
II U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(l) (West 2007).
Courts are split over whether the credit counseling may occur on the date of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition, or must occur no later than the prior day. Compare In re Hudson, 352 B.R. 391, 396
(Bankr. D. Md. 2006) (permitting credit counseling on date of filing), and In re Spears, 355 B.R. 116 (Bankr.
E.D. Wis. 2006) (same), and In re Warren, 339 B.R. 475, 479 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006) (same), with In re
Gossett, 369 B.R. 361, 370-71 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2007) (holding credit counseling on date of filing untimely),
and In re Cole, 347 B.R. 70, 74 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2006) (same), and In re Murphy, 342 B.R. 671, 673
(Bankr. D.D.C. 2006) (same).
13 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 2 (2005). The provision was inserted in the bill by the credit
counseling industry. See generally Allen Mattison, Can the New Bankruptcy Law Benefit Debtors, Too?
Interpreting the 2005 Bankrutpcy Act to Clean Up the Credit-Counseling Industry and Save Debtors from
Chronic Poverty, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 513, 520-21 (2007). Criticism has been leveled at the
requirements from their inception. See, e.g., Katherine A. Jeter-Boldt, Good in Theory, Bad in Practice: The
Unintended Consequences of BAPCPA 's Credit Counseling Requirement, 71 MO. L. REV. 1101, 1110-21
(2006); Karen Gross & Susan Block-Lieb, Empty Mandate or Opportunity for Innovation? Pre-Petition
Credit Counseling and Post-Petition Financial Management Education, 13 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 549
(2005).
14 H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 18.
2008]
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of the debt repayment plan, if any, developed under section 109(h)
through 1the approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling
agency.
Exhibit D to Official Form 1 (Voluntary Petition) provides a form of
certification to be signed by the debtor under penalty of perjury with respect to
his or her compliance with the credit counseling requirement, or grounds for
permanent or temporary waiver of that requirement. 16 Under Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(c), the certification must be filed with the
bankruptcy petition in a voluntary case.17
There are only three circumstances in which pre-filing credit counseling is
excused under the statute. First, if the district in which the individual resides
does not have approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agencies
reasonably able to provide adequate services to individuals required to obtain• 18
the counseling, the individual does not need to get the counseling. Because
of the large number of approved credit counseling agencies, few litigants have
used this basis to be excused from pre-filing credit counseling. 19  In only one
case has a court approved a waiver of the requirement under this provision, and
that decision turned on the debtor's inability to speak or understand any
15 11 U.S.C.A. § 52 1(b) (West 2007). Rule 1007(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
requires the filing of "a statement of compliance with the credit counseling requirement, prepared as
prescribed by the appropriate Official Form." FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(3) (interim rule). The statement is
required to include the following:
(A) An attached certificate and debt repayment plan, if any required by 521(b);
(B) A statement that the debtor has received the credit counseling briefing required by
109(h)(1) but does not have the certificate required by 521(b);
(C) A certification under 109(h)(3); or
(D) A request for a determination by the court under 109(h)(4).
Id. Although Rule 1007(b)(3) does not require the filing of a statement of compliance if the "United States
trustee [or bankruptcy administrator] has determined that the credit counseling requirement of 109(h) does not
apply in the district" (presumably under 109(h)(2)), id., Exhibit D to Official Form I contemplates that the
certification be filed by all individual debtors, even those claiming the 109(h)(2) exception. FED. BANKR.
FORM 1, Exhibit D.
16 FED. BANKR. FORM 1, Exhibit D.
17 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c) (interim rule). If the debtor certifies that he or she has completed the credit
counseling briefing required by 109(h)(1) but has not yet received the certificate from the agency providing the
briefing, the certificate must be filed within fifteen days of the order for relief. See id.
8 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(2)(A) (West 2007).
19 The list of approved credit counseling agencies is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/
ccde/cc-approved.html for those districts served by the U.S. Trustee program, and at http://www.uscourts.gov/
bankruptcycourts/approvedagencies.html for Alabama and North Carolina, which have bankruptcy
administrators.
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language except Creole (a language in which no credit counseling was
available at the time).2°
Second, an individual may receive a temporary deferral of the obligation to
obtain credit counseling by submitting to the court a certification 21 under
§ 109(h)(3)(A). The certification must satisfy the following three
requirements: (1) "describe[] exigent circumstances that merit a waiver of the
requirements [;],, 22 (2) "state[] that the [individual] requested credit counseling
from an approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency, but was
unable" to obtain the services in the five days following the request;23 and (3)
the court must find the certification "satisfactory.,
24
The term "exigent circumstances" is not defined in § 109(h). 25  In the
absence of legislative guidance, many courts have turned to Black's Law
Dictionary for help.26  Black's Law defines "exigent circumstances" as "[a]
situation that demands unusual or immediate action and that may allow people
20 See In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696, 700 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). Credit counseling is now available
in many different languages, including Haitian Creole, and available agencies are listed by language on the
U.S. Trustee website. http://www.usdoj.gov/ust/eo/bapcpa/ccde/cc-approved.htm.
21 In the early months after II U.S.C. 109(h)(3)(A) went into effect, courts struggled with the meaning of
the term "certification." Some courts required only a written statement signed by the debtor. See, e.g., In re
Henderson, 339 B.R. 34, 38 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 296 (Bankr. W.D. Ky.
2005); In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 420-21 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. 430, 434 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 2005). However, most courts concluded that the submission must be a declaration sworn to by the
debtor under penalty of perjury in compliance with 28 U.S.C. § 1746. See, e.g., In re Vian, No. 07-50369,
2007 WL 1788995, at *1 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 1, 2007); In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. 195, 198 n.2 (Bankr. S.D.
Ind. 2006); In re Cobb, 343 B.R. 204, 207-08 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 2006); In re Dansby, 340 B.R. 564, 567
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Miller, 336 B.R. 232, 238 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R.
462,470 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 887 n.3 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); In re Hubbard,
333 B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 881-82 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005). A
motion filed by the debtor's attorney without any signature by the debtor is clearly inadequate. See, e.g., In re
Wilson, 346 B.R. 59, 60, 63 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006); In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693, 696 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
2006). See generally Jeffrey A. Deller & Nicholas E. Meriwether, Putting Order to the Madness: BAPCPA
and the Contours of the New Prebankruptcy Credit Counseling Requirements, 16 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, Art.
5 (Feb. 2007). The promulgation of new Exhibit D to Official Form 1 in October 2006, which provides for
certification by the debtor under penalty of perjury, should resolve this controversy.
22 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(3)(A)(i) (West 2007).
23 Id. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii).
24 Id. § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii).
25 See id. § 109(h).
26 See, e.g., In re Giambrone, 365 B.R. 386, 389 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Morales, No. 806-
70854-478, 2006 WL 2050555, at *3 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May 24, 2006); In re Anderson, No. 06-00047S, 2006
WL 314539, at *2 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Feb. 6, 2006); In re Henderson, 339 B.R. at 38; In re Curington, No. 05-
38188, 2005 WL 3752229, at *4 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801, 802 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 2005); In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. at 471; In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 435.
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to circumvent usual procedures." 27  This definition suggests that exigent
circumstances have a temporal component; something bad has not yet
happened, but is about to happen, requiring the person who will be adversely
affected to take action to prevent it. Absent a showing that some imminent
harm would ensue from a delay in the filing of the bankruptcy petition, courts
uniformly decline to find existent circumstances exist.28 Indeed, most cases in
which debtors assert the existence of exigent circumstances involve
29 30 31
repossession of an automobile, foreclosure on real property, eviction, or
garnishment of wages.32 In these cases, some courts find the prospective loss
of one's asset, before credit counseling can be obtained, sufficient in itself to
establish exigent circumstances. 33  Other courts criticize this approach as
allowing debtors to wait until the last minute to obtain credit counseling, and
then seek to excuse their own negligence.34  Instead, even in the face of
imminent foreclosure, debtors cannot obtain a deferral of the credit counseling
requirement from these courts unless they can explain to the court's satisfaction
why they did not seek credit counseling earlier.
35
27 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 260 (8th ed. 2004).
28 See, e.g., In re Vian, No. 07-50369, 2007 WL 1788995, at *1 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 1, 2007); In re
Postlethwait, 353 B.R. 428, 428 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Anderson, 2006 WL 314539, at *2; In re
Henderson, 339 B.R. at 40; In re Warden, No. 05-23750, 2005 WL 3207630, at *2-*3 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Nov.
22, 2005).
29 See, e.g., In re Postlethwait, 353 B.R. at 428; In re Davenport, 335 B.R. 218, 220 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 384 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005).
30 See, e.g., In re Dixon, 338 B.R. 383, 385 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In re Giambrone, 365 BR. at 388; In
re Henderson, 364 B.R. 906, 909 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); In re Toccaline, No. 06-20218, 2006 WL 2081517,
at *1 (Bankr. D. Conn July 17, 2006); In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664, 666 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In re
DiPinto, 336 B.R. 693, 696-97 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2006); In re Miller, 336 B.R. 232, 235 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
2006); In re Talib, 335 B.R. 417, 418-19 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 435; In re
Wallert, 332 B.R. 884, 887 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 384.
31 See, e.g., In re Dixon, No. A07-00209-DMD, 2007 WL 1453067, at *1 (Bankr. D. Alaska May 17,
2007); In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798, 803 n.16 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006).
32 See, e.g., In re Romero, 349 B.R. 616, 619 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006).
33 See, e.g., In re Giambrone, 365 B.R. at 391; In re Henderson, 364 B.R. 906 at 916; In re Romero, 349
B.R. at 619; In re Carey, 341 B.R. at 800, 803; In re Miller, 336 B.R. at 235; In re Graham, 336 B.R. 292, 297
(Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2005); In re Childs, 335 B.R. 623, 630 (Bankr. D. Md. 2005); In re Valdez, 335 B.R. 801,
803 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2005); In re Davenport, 335 B.R. at 220-21; In re Cleaver, 333 B.R. at 435; In re
Wallert, 332 B.R. at 887; In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. at 384; In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
2005).
34 See, e.g., In re Givhan, No. 06-40389-DRD, 2006 WL 4451481, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 23,
2006); In re Kimsel, No. 06-00539, 2006 WL 2380684, at *1 (Bankr. D. Haw. Aug. 16, 2006); In re Afolabi,
343 B.R. 195, 198 (Bankr. S. D. Ind. 2006); In re Dixon, 338 B.R. at 388; In re DiPinto, 336 B.R. at 697-98;
In re Valdez, 335 BR. at 803; In re Talib, 335 B.R. at 421-22. See generally Deller & Meriwether, supra note
21.
35 See, e.g., In re Givhan, No. 06-40389-DRD, 2006 WL 4451481, at *1; In re Kimsel, No. 06-00539,
2006 WL 2380684, at * 1; In re Afolabi, 343 B.R. at 198; In re Dixon, 338 B.R. at 388; In re DiPinto, 336 B.R.
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Even if "exigent circumstances" are present, the debtor must also certify
that the debtor requested credit counseling from an approved credit counseling
agency, and "was unable to obtain the services . . . during the 5-day period
beginning on the date on which the debtor made that request. ' 36 This separate
requirement can, as some courts have noted, impose significant hardships.
Even if the debtor faces "exigent circumstances," if the credit counseling
agency can provide a briefing within five days of the request for counseling,
the debtor is ineligible for a temporary deferral, even though filing after the
counseling would not prevent the imminent harm creating the exigent
circumstances.
37
At least one court has declined to give effect to the literal language of this
provision, suggesting that the five-day period referred to in § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii)
is intended to mean five days or the period between the request for credit
counseling and the time of the bankruptcy filing compelled by exigent
circumstances, whichever is shorter. 38 This interpretation is consistent with the
one urged by some leading bankruptcy commentators, who believe the phrase
"unable to obtain the services referred to in [§ 109(h)(1)],, 39 refers to
prepetition credit counseling, not to credit counseling services in general.4n
Most courts, however, require the debtor to show both that he or she made
a request for credit counseling services before filing a bankruptcy petition,4 1
at 697-98; In re Valdez, 335 B.R. at 803; In re Talib, 335 B.R. at 421-22. See generally Deller & Meriwether,
supra note 21.
36 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) (West 2007). The statute is unclear as to whether the inability to
receive credit counseling services must be attributable to the unavailability of those services from the agency
during the relevant time period, or may instead be due to the debtor's own circumstances, such as inability to
pay for the services. See, e.g., In re Piontek, 346 B.R. 126, 130 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006).
37 See, e.g., In re Burrell, 339 B.R. 664, 667 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2006); In re Rodriguez, 336 B.R. 462,
472-73 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2005); In re Talib, 335 B.R. at 423-24; In re Wallert, 332 B.R. at 889. Noting this
anomaly, the court in In re Dansby, 340 B.R. 564, 568-69 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006), interpreted the language to
require that the request for credit counseling services occur at least five days before the petition is filed. See
generally Deller & Meriwether, supra note 21 (rejecting the Dansby court's interpretation).
38 See In re Giambrone, 365 B.R. 386, 391-92 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2007).
39 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(3)(A)(ii) (West 2007).
40 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 11 109.09[3], 109-60 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 15th
ed. rev. 2007). See also Vanessa A. Lantin, Don't Be Cruel: Did Congress Really Intend to Deny an
Individual "Emergency Debtor," Acting in Good Faith, the Opportunity to be a Debtor Under the Bankruptcy
Code?, 15 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 3, Art. 4 (June 2006).
41 See, e.g., In re Jenkins, No. 06-15045-NVA, 2006 WL 4549183, at *1 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 18, 2006);
In re Reese, No. 06-15184-NVA (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 12, 2006), 2006 WL 4547177, at *1 (Bankr. D. Md.
Sept. 12, 2006); In re Wilson, 346 B.R. 59, 62 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798, 803
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006); In re Carr, 344 B.R. 774, 775 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006); Iz re Calderon, No. 06-
10561-BKCLMI, 2006 WL 871477, at *1 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 8, 2006); In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 155
20081
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and that the credit counseling services could not be provided within five days
42
of that request. In the absence of either of these two showings, the debtor is
ineligible for bankruptcy.
43
Assuming that the debtor includes the required statements in his or her
certification, the court must still find the certification "satisfactory" before the
pre-filing credit counseling requirement is waived.44 This requirement has
been interpreted merely to invoke judicial review of the adequacy of the
statements included in the certification under the statutory requirements of
§§ 109(h)(A)(i) and (ii). 45  Other courts view the third requirement as
permitting the court to pass judgment on the form of the certification itself,
rather than its content.4 6
Even if the court accepts the certification and waives the pre-filing credit
counseling requirement, the debtor still must get the required credit counseling
within thirty days of filing the petition, unless the court, for cause, extends the
period for an additional fifteen days.47
(Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 135 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); In re Sosa, 336 B.R. 113, 115
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 2005); In re Davenport, 335 B.R. 218, 221 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Cleaver, 333
B.R. 430, 435 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2005); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 386 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); In re
Watson, 332 B.R. 740, 745-46 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2005); In re LaPorta, 332 B.R. 879, 882 (Bankr. D. Minn.
2005); In re Gee, 332 B.R. 602, 604 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2005); In re Booth, No. 05-45002-LMK, 2005 WL
3434776, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. Oct. 19, 2005) (debtor had not requested credit counseling prior to filing).
42 See, e.g., In re Toccaline, No. 06-20218, 2006 WL 2081517, at *2-*3 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 17, 2006)
(credit counseling services were in fact provided four days after request and four days after filing, and could
have been provided prior to filing if debtor had the fee at that time); In re Burrell, 339 B.R. at 667 (debtor
alleged that she could not receive credit counseling services before filing made to stop foreclosure, but could
have received them within five days after request); In re Givhan, No. 06-40389-DRD, 2006 WL 4451481, at
*1 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. Mar. 23, 2006) (debtor stated that she could not receive credit counseling before
foreclosure sale triggering bankruptcy filing later that day, but not that credit counseling was unavailable in the
next five days); In re Talib, 335 B.R. at 419 (debtor requested credit counseling prior to filing, and was told it
could be completed two days later, but after foreclosure sale); In re Wallert, 332 B.R. at 887 (debtor requested
credit counseling, but could not get it prior to foreclosure the next day). Cf. In re Westenberger, No. 0610477-
BKC-RBR, 2006 WL 1105008, at "1-*2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Mar. 15, 2006) (debtor was deemed unable to
receive credit counseling within five days after request when debtor's bank account had been frozen and debtor
had no funds to pay for credit counseling).
43 In re Burrell, 339 B.R. at 667.
44 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(3)(A)(iii) (West 2007).
45 See, e.g., In re Dixon, 338 B.R. 383, 387 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2006); In re Walton, No. 07-41086-293,
2007 WL 980430, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2007); In re Burrell, 339 B.R. at 667.
46 See, e.g., In re Morales, No. 806-70854-478, 2006 WL 2050555, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. May, 24
2006).
47 I1 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(3)(B) (West 2007).
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It is possible for an individual to be permanently excused from the required
credit counseling, but only if the court determines, after notice and a hearing,
that the individual "is unable to complete those requirements because of
incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a military combat zone. 48 The
exemption is intended to prevent "the absurd situation in which a debtor would
be required to complete a course even if suffering from Alzheimers Disease or
some other disability that would make the course meaningless or even
impossible. 49
Section 109(h)(4) defines "incapacity" as impairment "by reason of mental
illness or mental deficiency" to the extent that the debtor "is incapable of
realizing and making rational decisions with respect to his financial
responsibilities." 50 A debtor is not disabled unless he or she "is so physically
impaired as to be unable, after reasonable effort, to participate in an in-person,
telephone, or Internet briefing" prior to filing. 51 This requires not only a
showing of an impairment, but the court must also determine that, first, the
debtor has made a reasonable effort to participate in a briefing, and second, the
debtor was unable, because of the disability, to participate meaningfully in
such a briefing.
52
The exemption is rarely invoked successfully. In In re Tulper, the court
excused joint debtors, one of whom was wheelchair bound, suffering from
tremors, using an oxygen compressor/ventilator, and taking numerous
prescribed medications, which her counsel suggested impaired her ability to
understand communications. 53 The other debtor was 81 years old, 97% deaf,
and "had a 40% disability with respect to use of his hands and feet." 54 Neither
debtor had access to a computer or computer skills.55 The court concluded that
both debtors suffered from a "disability. ' '56  Although neither debtor had
attempted to participate in credit counseling prior to filing, the court suggested
that such participation would be meaningless because of their physical
48 id. § 109(h)(4).
49 2 COLLIER, supra note 40, 11328.08, 1328-40.
50 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(4) (West 2007).
51 Id.
52 See, e.g., In re Winston, No. 07-20593-D-1 3L, 2007 WL 1650926, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. June 6,
2007); In re Tulper, 345 B.R. 322, 326 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006).
53 In re Tulper, 345 B.R. at 324-25, 328.
14 Id. at 325.
" Id. at 324-25.
56 Id. at 325-28.
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condition, and therefore was unnecessary. 57 The court further concluded that
one of the debtors was incapacitated because her medications created a "mental
deficiency" that impaired her ability to make rational decisions with respect to
her finances.
58
Similarly, in In re Jarrell,59 the debtor had been diagnosed with bipolar
disorder, schizophrenia, and clinical depression, and had been hospitalized
multiple times for his mental problems.60  The court concluded that, although
the debtor was not incapacitated within the meaning of § 109(h)(4), he was
disabled. 6 1 The debtor in In re Howard62 had been in the intensive care unit of
the hospital for the sixteen days before the bankruptcy filing for cardiac arrest,
and after his release suffered from short-term memory loss, hearing loss, and
limited mobility.63  The court excused credit counseling on the basis of
disability. 64 Disability was also the basis for a permanent exception for the
debtor in In re Myers,65 who was confined to a nursing home with dementia.
66
B. Postpetition Credit Counseling
Under the new § 727(a)(1 1), after filing, 67 an individual debtor must
complete an instructional course concerning personal financial management in
order to obtain a discharge in a chapter 7 case.68 A similar provision is now
17 Id. at 327-28.
I d. at 328 n.13.
5 364 B.R. 899 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007).
60 Id. at 902.
61 Id. at 905.
62 59 B.R. 589 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 2007).
63 Id. at 590.
64 id.
65 350 B.R. 760, 761 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2006).
66 Id.
67 One court has allowed the debtor to obtain a discharge despite the fact that the personal financial
management course was taken one day before filing, suggesting that the language of § 727(a)( 1) was
"ambiguous." In re Hensinger, No. BKR. No. 06-11319 EEB, 2006 WL 905313, at *1 (Bankr. D. Colo. Apr.
6,2006).
68 11 U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(1 1) reads as follows:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(11) after filing the petition, the debtor failed to complete an instructional course concerning
personal financial management described in section 111, except that this paragraph shall
not apply with respect to a debtor who is a person described in section 109(h)(4) or who
resides in a district for which the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if
any) determines that the approved instructional courses are not adequate to service the
additional individuals who would otherwise be required to complete such instructional
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included in § 1328(g)(1) as a condition to a chapter 13 discharge. 69  The
purpose of this training is to provide debtors "with guidance about how to
manage their finances, so that they can avoid future financial difficulties. 7 °
An individual debtor indicates completion of the personal financial
71 72management course by filing a statement7  on Official Form 23. The
certification must be filed "within 45 days after the first date set for the
meeting of creditors under § 341 of the Code" in a chapter 7 case,7 3 and "no
later than the date when the last payment was made by the debtor as required
by the plan or the filing of a motion for a discharge under § 1328(b)" in a
74
chapter 13 case.
The postpetition financial management course requirement for a chapter 7
or chapter 13 discharge is excused in only two circumstances. The first is
when the debtor "is a person described in section 109(h)(4)," 75 i.e., "a debtor
whom the court determines, after notice and hearing, is unable to complete
those requirements because of incapacity, disability, or active military duty in a
military combat zone. ' 76  For example, an 81 year old, physically limited,
courses under this section (The United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if
any) who makes a determination described in this paragraph shall review such
determination not later than 1 year after the date of such determination, and not less
frequently than annually thereafter.).
II U.S.C.A. § 727(a)(l 1) (West 2007). This course is a separate counseling session from the prepetition
course. See, e.g., In re Swiatkowski, 356 B.R. 581, 583-84 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Johnson, No. 06-
40028-LMK, 2006 WL 1548627, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. May 12, 2006); In re Rodgers, No. 05-90028, 2005
WL 3454702, at *1 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2005).
69 11 U.S.C.A. § 1328(g) reads as follows:
(1) The court shall not grant a discharge under this section to a debtor unless after filing a
petition the debtor has completed an instructional course concerning personal financial
management described in section 111.
(2) Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to a debtor who is a person described in section
109(h)(4) or who resides in a district for which the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy
administrator, if any) determines that the approved instructional courses are not adequate to
service the additional individuals who would otherwise be required to complete such
instructional course by reason of the requirements of paragraph (1).
II U.S.C.A. § 1328(g) (West 2007).
70 H.R. REP. No. 109-31,pt. 1, at 18 (2005).
71 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(b)(7) (interim rule).
72 FED. BANKR. FORM 23.
73 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c) (interim rule).
74 id.
75 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 727(a)(l 1), 1328(g)(2) (West 2007).
76 Id. § 109(h)(4).
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hearing-impaired debtor with prostate cancer whose prepetition counseling
session took three hours and ended unsatisfactorily, was excused from
postpetition counseling because of a disability. 77 Another debtor, who suffered
from dementia, memory loss, and a general state of confusion, was found to be
incapacitated and, therefore, excused under § 727(a)(1 1).78
One court has looked beyond the literal language of § 109(h)(4) to excuse a
debtor from the personal financial management course requirement when the
debtor was not incapacitated, disabled, or on military duty, but was in fact
deceased, a circumstance not contemplated by the statute.7 9
The requirement is also excused if the debtor "resides in a district for which
the United States trustee (or the bankruptcy administrator, if any) determines
that the approved instructional courses are not adequate to service the
additional individuals who would otherwise be required to complete" 80 the
required instructional courses. The only case in which a court appeared to rely
on this exception involved an inmate and will be discussed in Part II.
Unlike the prepetition credit counseling requirement under § 109(h)(3),
there is no provision for deferral of the personal financial management
requirement because of "exigent circumstances" or otherwise. However,
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1007(c) explicitly contemplates an
extension of time for the filing of "the schedules, statements, and other
documents required under this rule," 8 1 which includes the statement evidencing
completion of the postpetition credit counseling course under Rule 1007(b)(7),
"for cause shown.' 82 Therefore, some courts have indicated that "exigent and
compelling circumstances" may justify an extension in some rare cases,83
although no court has yet granted such an extension. Instead, if the case has
been closed without the grant of a discharge, the debtor is required to file a
77 In re Hall, 347 B.R. 532, 534-36 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006). Cf. In re Stockwell, No. 06-10002, 2006
WL 1149182, at *1-*2 (Bankr. D. Vt. Aug. 17, 2006) (debtor failed to provide sufficient evidence to support
allegations of disability or incapacity, although her treatment for a brain tumor, loss of vision, and heavy
medication would warrant a waiver if established).
78 In re Faircloth, No.05-54214,2006 WL 3731299, at *1 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Dec. 18, 2006).
79 In re Trembulak, 362 B.R. 205, 207 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2007).
80 11 U.S.C. §§ 727(a)( 1I), 1328(g)(2) (2000). This is comparable to the first basis for excusing
prepetition credit counseling described in § 109(h)(2).
81 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c) (interim rule).
82 Id.
83 See In re Martinez, No. 05-07309, 2006 WL 681068, at * I (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Mar. 13, 2006). See In
re Hassett, 341 B.R. 832, 834 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
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motion to reopen the case under § 350(b), 84 and may be required to pay an
additional filing fee.
85
II. PRISONERS AND CREDIT COUNSELING
As was true for many debtors, 86 some prisoners sought to file bankruptcy
petitions before the effective date of the BAPCPA amendments, October 17,
2005. Those who succeeded, including those whose filings were deemed made
before October 17, 2005, by application of the "prison mailbox rule,' 87 were
found not to be subject to the new requirements.
However, those prisoners whose petitions were filed after October 17,
2005, are clearly subject to the counseling requirements and have found them
difficult to satisfy. They cannot make a physical appearance at an approved
nonprofit budget and credit counseling agency because of their imprisonment.
Congress explicitly contemplated that debtors would be able to satisfy the
requirements by telephone or internet counseling, but prisoners are given
84 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) states that "[a] case may be reopened in the court in which such case was closed to
administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor or for other cause." II U.S.C. § 350(b) (2000).
85 See, e.g., In re Knight, 349 B.R. 681, 696 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006).
86 The Administrative Office of the United States Courts publishes statistics on bankruptcy filings for
annual, fiscal year, and three-month periods. In the three-month period ending on September 30, 2005, before
the BAPCPA became effective, there were 532,526 non-business bankruptcy filings. Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts, December 1, 2005, Table F-2 (3 Months Period), http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/
archive2005.html. In the next quarter, which included the last-minute filings seeking to precede the October
17, 2005 effective date, there were 654,633 non-business filings. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts,
March 24, 2006, Table F-2 (3 Months Period), http://www.uscourts.gov/Press Releases/archive2006.html. In
the first quarter of 2006, the first full quarter in which the amendments were effective, non-business
bankruptcy filings dropped to 112,685. Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, May 26, 2006, Table F-2 (3
Months Period), http://www.uscourts.gov/PressReleases/archive2006.html.
87 The "prison mailbox rule" was developed by the Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270
(1988). A pro se prisoner delivered a notice of appeal to prison authorities to forward to the clerk of court
within thirty days of the entry of the judgment as required by Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(l), but
it was not received by the clerk within the required time. Id. at 268-69. The Court concluded that as long as
the notice reached the clerk, it would be deemed filed as of the time the prisoner delivered the notice to the
prison authorities. Id. at 276. The prison mailbox rule requires that the prisoner is proceeding pro se and that
he or she delivers the documents for filing to prison authorities within the required period. See, e.g., Stillman
v. LaMarque, 319 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 2003). The rule has been applied to various types of filings by pro
se prisoners. See, e.g., Richard v. Ray, 290 F.3d 810, 813 (6th Cir. 2002) (civil complaint); Jones v. Bertrand,
171 F.3d 499, 508 (7th Cir. 1999) (habeas petitions); Caldwell v. Amend, 30 F.3d 1199, 1201 (9th Cir. 1994)
(Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 50(b) motion); Garvey v. Vaughn, 993 F.2d 776, 777, 781-82 (1 1th Cir. 1993) (claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Federal Tort Claims Act).
88 See, e.g., In re Luedtke, 337 B.R. 918, 919, 921 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006); In re Looper, 334 BR. 596,
601-02 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2005).
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limited access to telephones89 and computers with internet access.90  Even
when they are allowed to use a telephone or a computer, they are often not
permitted to remain on the line for the time necessary to complete the credit
counseling.91 Despite this, inmates have had relatively little success in being
excused from the prepetition or postpetition credit counseling requirements,
either temporarily or permanently.
A. Permanent Exception for Lack of Availability of Credit Counseling
Services
As discussed previously, 92  an individual is not required to obtain
prepetition or postpetition counseling if the United States trustee or bankruptcy
administrator determines that the approved nonprofit budget and credit
counseling agencies in the district in which the individual resides are not
reasonably able to provide adequate services to individuals required to obtain
the counseling. 93 However, in bankruptcy cases involving prisoners, courts
have generally found this exception inapplicable, noting that the United States
trustee or bankruptcy administrator had not determined that the approved
counseling agencies in the districts where the inmates were incarcerated were
not reasonably able to provide adequate service to the inmates.
94
One could argue with this conclusion. The determination of the United
States trustee or bankruptcy administrator is reviewable by the court. 95  In
89 See, e.g., MICH. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE 05.03.130 (January 1, 2007) (stating that
all telephone calls must be "on a collect or prepaid basis" and are limited to fifteen minutes, except for calls to
attorneys, which are limited to twenty minutes). The only situation in which a prisoner may make a call
outside normal times is for an emergency, such as "critical illness or death of an immediate family member,
serious prisoner illness, or other situation as determined by the Warden or designee." Id. A prisoner may only
call individuals or organizations on a prisoner's approved telephone list, or those persons or organizations
identified on the universal list of attorneys, court monitors, public interest groups, governmental agencies, and
similar persons and groups. Id. No credit counseling agencies are currently included on the universal list. Id.
at Attachment B.
90 See, e.g., MICH. DEPT. OF CORRECTIONS, POLICY DIRECTIVE 01.04.104 (July 1, 2007) (stating that
"[u]nder no circumstances shall a prisoner be permitted to use a computer which has Internet access.").
91 For example, the inmate in In re Walton, No. 07-41086-293, 2007 WL 980430, at *1 (Bankr. E.D. Mo.
Mar. 5, 2007), was allowed only a one half-hour phone conversation, and only one call per month. He used his
call to obtain credit counseling, but was put on hold by the credit counseling agency for twenty-five minutes,
leaving insufficient time for the counseling. Id. at *2.
92 See supra text accompanying notes 17-19, 80.
9' 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 109(h)(2), 727(a)( 11), 1328(g)(2) (West 2007).
94 See, e.g., In re Ruckdaschel, 364 B.R. 724, 728 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); In re McBride, 354 B.R. 95,
99 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Star, 341 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
95 See, e.g., In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. 696, 699-700 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006); In re Hubbard, 333 B.R.
373, 377 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005). But see In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2007)
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reviewing whether approved nonprofit budget and credit counseling agencies
for the relevant district are reasonably able to provide adequate services to the
debtor, the court arguably may consider whether the available agencies can
provide adequate services to a debtor possessing the particular characteristics
of the debtor seeking review.
96
Thus, in In re Petit-Louis, the sole case in which a court has granted a
permanent exemption from pre-filing credit counseling under § 109(h)(2), the
court concluded that counseling services were not reasonably available unless
they met the needs of debtors having the unique characteristics of the debtor in
question. 97  The debtor, Mr. Petit-Louis, spoke and understood only Creole
rather than English.98 In the case of an inmate, the debtor may be entitled to an
exemption if the counseling agencies do not provide adequate services to those
who lack an ability to make an in-person visit to the agency or to reach it by
internet or telephone (at least for the length of time necessary to complete the
counseling). Perhaps credit counseling is not reasonably available to prisoners
unless the agency providing the services is willing to make a "house call."
The court in In re Vollmer seemed to adopt this analysis. Noting that the
United States trustee had not located a credit counseling agency that would
accept collect calls from an incarcerated debtor (the only circumstances under
which the debtor would be able to complete credit counseling),99 the court
concluded that "no credit counseling agency [was] reasonably able to provide
adequate service to the Debtor in [that] District" and permanently waived
compliance with the prepetition credit counseling requirements of §109(h)(1),
(concluding that Congress left the determination to the United States trustee to be made on a "district wide
basis").
96 For example, commentators have suggested that:
[t]he United States trustee or bankruptcy administrator will have to decide whether adequate
services are available if the only services available to some debtors are over the telephone or on
the Internet. Not all debtors have access to the Intemet and some debtors do not have a telephone
or are unable to use a telephone due to hearing problems. Debtors in this situation may also find
it difficult or impossible to travel to a distant agency due to the expense involved or for other
reasons.
2 COLLIER, supra note 40, 91 109.09[2], 109-59. See also id. IT 1328.08, 1328-39 ("This language is peculiar
and raises questions about whether the lack tof] availability of courses can be found with respect to a particular
group of individuals, such as those residing in a particular geographic area or those who speak only certain
languages other than English.").
97 In re Petit-Louis, 344 B.R. at. 700-01.
98 Id. at 700.
99 In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. at 814.
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as well as the postpetition requirement for completion of a personal financial
management course under § 727(a)(11).l00
B. Temporary Exception from Prepetition Credit Counseling for Exigent
Circumstances
Some courts have allowed inmates to benefit from the temporary deferral
of the prepetition credit counseling requirement because of "exigent
circumstances,"'' 1  and have done so despite. the inmate's failure to comply
with the technical requirements of § 109(h)(3). For example, in In re Star, the
court treated the debtor's motion to proceed without meeting the credit
counseling requirement of § 109(h) as a motion to defer credit counseling
under § 109(h)(3). °2 The court then granted the motion, "given [the] debtor's
current circumstance[s].' ' 3  The debtor had neither requested credit
counseling prior to filing, nor had the debtor shown any "exigent
circumstances" other than the incarceration itself.10 4  Another court followed
the statute more closely and allowed deferral 'when the state was seeking
incarceration reimbursement from the inmate's IRA ("exigent
circumstances"). 105 The inmate had requested credit counseling five days prior
to filing, but was unable to complete it because the agency put him on hold for
twenty-five minutes, exhausting his available telephone time for the month. 1
06
Most courts have simply rejected requests by prisoners under § 109(h)(3),
concluding that the debtors had failed to comply with the requirements for a
temporary waiver. 107
'oo Id. at 815.
'o' 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(3) (West 2007).
102 In re Star, 341 B.R. 830, 832 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
103 Id. at 832.
104 Id. at 831. See also In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. at 814 (granting deferral "[a]s it was not possible for the
debtor to request credit counseling services prior to filing" because of incarceration).
105 In re Walton, No. 07-41086-293, 2007 WL 980430, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Mar. 5, 2007).
106 id.
107 See, e.g., In re Rendler, 368 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007) (deferral of requirement would do
inmate "no good" given ongoing inability to participate in credit counseling); In re Ruckdaschel, 364 B.R.
724, 728-29 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007) (no showing of exigent circumstances by inmate); In re Martinez, No. 06
B 05861, 2006 WL 2239445, at *1-*2 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2006) (dismising case filed by inmate with
limited knowledge of English for failure to file § 521 (b)(l) certificate as to credit counseling); In re McBride,
354 B.R. 95, 98 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2006) (incarceration does not constitute "exigent circumstances"); In re
Latovljevic, 343 B.R. 817, 822 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006) (debtor did not request that prison officials provide
debtor sufficient telephone time for credit counseling, so no showing debtor was unable to receive counseling).
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C. Permanent Exception for Incapacity, Disability or Military Service
Attempts by prisoners to secure a permanent exception from the prepetition
counseling requirements on the basis of incapacity, disability, or military
service, within the meaning of § 109(h)(4), have also been consistently
unsuccessful. Prisoners are not on active military duty in a military combat
zone. In addition, because the definition of "incapacity" in § 109(h)(4)
requires a showing of "mental illness or mental deficiency,"' 0 8 inmates have
not argued for a waiver on this basis. However, "disability" is defined more
broadly, requiring that the debtor be "physically impaired."'10 9 One could
certainly argue that imprisonment constitutes a physical impairment within the
meaning of the statute, and that inmates should therefore be entitled to a
permanent exemption.
Courts have considered whether incarceration constitutes "physical
impairment."' 10  After considering the definition of "impaired" in the
American Heritage College Dictionary,"'I most courts have concluded that
incarceration does not create a physical impairment within the meaning of the
statute. 112  Other courts have rejected the statute's applicability without a
detailed analysis of the language."
3
Despite the fact that § 109(h)(4) clearly invites the court to determine on a
case-by-case basis whether the debtor qualifies for the permanent waiver, the
court in In re Rendler concluded that the incapacity and disability grounds for
noncompliance with the prepetition credit counseling requirement were
"strictly-defined and narrow."' 114 Furthermore, they do not permit waiver:
where, for instance, credit counseling services on an in-person basis
are unavailable locally to the debtor; or where participating in
counseling imposes personal inconvenience on the debtor in some
other way; or, really, on the grounds of any other consideration that
108 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(h)(4) (West 2007).
109 Id.
110 See, e.g., In re Ruckdaschel, 364 B.R. at 729; In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. 811, 813 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2007); In re Star, 341 B.R. 830, 831 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2006).
111 The definition states that "impaired" means: "1. Diminished, damaged, or weakened; 2. Functioning
poorly or incompetently; 3. Having a physical or mental disability." AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE
DICrIONARY 694 (4th ed. 2004).
112 See, e.g., In re Ruckdaschel, 364 B.R. at 729; In re Vollmer, 361 B.R. at 813; In re Star, 341 B.R. at
831.
113 See, e.g., In re Rendler, 368 B.R. 1, 4 (Bankr. D. Minn. 2007); In re McBride, 354 B.R. 95, 99-100
(Bankr. D.S.C. 2006); In re Latovljevic, 343 B.R. 817, 821-22 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va. 2006).
114 In re Rendler, 368 B.R. at 2.
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stems from a debtor's personal circumstances, no matter how
extreme. 115
III. JUDICIAL DISCRETION TO EXCUSE NONCOMPLIANCE
Although arguments can be made to provide for permanent exceptions to
the credit counseling requirement for inmate-debtors based either on their
"disability" or the unavailability of credit counseling services in their district
for debtors in their unique position, for those courts which find that such
analyses strain the language of the statute too far, a more palatable approach
lies in those cases that have examined the extent of judicial discretion to
excuse noncompliance with the credit counseling requirements.
The requirements of § 109(h) are not jurisdictional. 1 6  Therefore, courts
have refused to allow debtors who become disenchanted with their bankruptcy
cases to invoke their own failure to satisfy the requirements of § 109(h) as
grounds for automatic dismissal, finding the pre-filing credit counseling
requirement waivable.117
There are provisions in the Code that provide for mandatory dismissal of a
case as a sanction for noncompliance with certain requirements. For example,
failure of an individual debtor in a chapter 7 or a chapter 13 case to file all the
information required by § 521(a)(1) 118 within forty-five days of the filing
115 Id. at 2-3 (emphasis added). The court went on to note that the inmate debtor, who was not excused
from prepetition credit counseling under § 109(h)(4), would not have been excused from the requirement of
§ 727(a)(1 1) either. Id. at 4 n.4.
116 See, e.g., In re Mendez, 367 B.R. 109, 116-18 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2007); In re Gaddis, No. 07-40476,
2007 WL 1610783, at *2 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 4, 2007); In re Manalad, 360 B.R. 288, 295 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2007); In re Parker, 351 BR. 790, 796 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006); In re Westover, No. 06-10183, 2006 WL
1982751, at *2 (Bankr. D. Vt. July 11, 2006); In re Seaman, 340 B.R. 698, 707 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re
Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 159 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006); In re Ross, 338 B.R. 134, 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006).
See also COLLIER, supra note 40, at 1 109.01[2], 109-6.2. Courts have reached the same conclusion with
respect to other provisions in 109. See, e.g., In re Valenti, 310 B.R. 138, 147-48 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004); In re
Wenberg, 94 B.R. 631, 637 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1988), aff'd, 902 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Jones, 134 B.R.
274, 280-82 (N.D. I11. 1991). See generally COLLIER, supra note 40, 109.01[2], 109-8.
117 See In re Mendez, 367 B.R. at 114-18; In re Withers, No. 06-42098 TM, 2007 WL 628078, at *2
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Feb. 26, 2007); In re Parker, 351 BR. at 799.
Is I U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) requires that the debtor file:
(A) a list of creditors; and
(B) unless the court orders otherwise-
(i) a schedule of assets and liabilities;
(ii) a schedule of current income and current expenditures;
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triggers automatic dismissal of the case on the forty-sixth day."19 If a debtor
does not file required tax returns within ninety days of a request by the taxing
authority, the court is required to convert or dismiss the case, whichever is in
the best interests of the creditors and the estate. 20 In a chapter 13 case, if the
debtor fails to file a tax return under § 1308, on request of a party in interest or
the United States trustee, the court is required to dismiss the case or convert it
to chapter 7, whichever is in the best interests of the creditors and the estate.' 21
The Code does not explicitly mandate dismissal of a bankruptcy case because
of failure to satisfy the eligibility requirements of §109(h), nor for failure to
file the required certificate from the approved credit counseling agency that
provides the prepetition counseling.
In its decision analyzing the provisions of § 706(a),' 22 the Court of Appeals
of the First Circuit distinguished the phrase "may convert" in that section from
the phrase "shall dismiss" used in § 1307(b) 123 to bolster its conclusion that a
court has discretion to deny a debtor's motion to convert under § 706(a).1
24
The Supreme Court recently affirmed that decision.' 25  Courts have made a
(iii) a statement of the debtor's financial affairs and, if section 342(b) applies, a certificate
[with respect to the required notice under that section];
(iv) copies of all payment advices or other evidence of payment received within 60 days
before the date of the filing of the petition, by the debtor from any employer of the
debtor;
(v) a statement of the amount of monthly net income, itemized to show how the amount
is calculated; and
(vi) a statement disclosing any reasonably anticipated increase in income or expenditures
over the 12-month period following the date of the filing of the petition.
II U.S.C.A. § 521(a)(l) (West 2007).
119 Id. § 521(i)(1). See, e.g., In re Reyes, No. 06-32767, 2007 WL 338066, at *3 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan.
31, 2007); In re Spencer, No. 06-00314, 2006 WL 3820702, at *1 (Bankr. D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2006); In re Ott,
343 B.R. 264, 267 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2006). Upon request by the debtor within the forty-five day period, the
court has discretion to extend the time for filing for an additional forty-five days, 11 U.S.C.A. § 521(i)(3)
(West 2007), and upon a timely motion of the trustee, may even decline to dismiss the case "if the court finds
that the debtor attempted in good faith to file all the information required by subsection (a)(1)(B)(iv) and that
the best interests of creditors would be served by administration of the case." Id. § 521 (i)(4).
120 1 U.S.C.A. § 521(j)(2) (West 2007).
121 Id. § 1307(e). See, e.g., In re McCluney, No. 06-21175, 2007 WL 2219112, at *5 (Bankr. D. Kan.
June 22, 2007).
122 I I U.S.C. § 706(a) (2000).
123 ld. § 1307(b) (2000).
124 See In re Marrama, 430 F.3d 474, 478 (1st Cir. 2005). The court declined to construe § 1307(b) to
preclude any exercise of discretion by a bankruptcy court with respect to a motion to dismiss, stating that the
issue was not before it. Id. at 478 n.2. See also In re Cobb, No. CIV. A. 99-3193, 2000 WL 17840, at *3
(E.D. La. Jan. 11, 2000); In re McCraney, 172 B.R. 868, 869 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (finding court retains
discretion with respect to the § 1307(b) right to dismiss).
125 Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 127 S.Ct. 1105 (2007).
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similar distinction between the apparently mandatory language of § 1307(b)
and the language of § 1307(c), which states that the court "may convert a case"
for cause.
Nevertheless, when debtors have sought to keep their bankruptcy cases
alive, despite technical noncompliance with the requirements of § 109(h), most
courts have dismissed the case without even considering whether they had
discretion to do otherwise. When they have considered the issue, most courts
conclude that bankruptcy courts have no power to vary the specific
requirements of § 109(h) based on the facts and circumstances of individual
cases. 127  For example, courts have dismissed the case 128 when the debtor
obtained credit counseling from an approved agency more than 180 days prior
to filing the petition. 129  They have also dismissed cases when the debtor
126 See, e.g., In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 619-20 (2d Cir. 1999).
127 See, e.g., In re Moon, No. 06-40607, 2007 WL 1087452, at *1 (Bankr. D. Idaho. Apr. 5, 2007); In re
Ruckdaschel, 364 B.R. 724, 734 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2007); Clippard v. Bass, 365 B.R. 131, 137 (W.D. Tenn.
2007); In re Jones, 352 B.R. 813, 816 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006); In re Raymond, No. 06-10275-JMD, 2006 WL
1047033, at *1 (Bankr. D.N.H. Apr. 12, 2006); In re Curington, No. 05-38188, 2005 WL 3752229, at *6
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Dec. 19, 2005); In re Fields, 337 B.R. 173, 180 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2005). Cf. In re
Falcone, 370 B.R. 462, 466 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2007) (declining to decide whether the court had discretion not
to dismiss because facts warranted dismissal); In re Ginsberg, 354 B.R. 644 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006)
(suggesting that, even if the court had such discretion, it should not exercise such discretion in the case of
attomey error).
128 Courts have differed on whether the appropriate remedy for noncompliance with § 109(h) is dismissal
of the case (which can trigger statutory consequences upon a subsequent filing under § 362(c), which limits the
protection of the automatic stay to thirty days for debtors who have a case dismissed within the preceding one-
year period) or striking the petition in its entirety. Compare In re Falcone, 370 B.R. at 466, and Clippard, 365
B.R. at 138, and In re Dillard, No. 06-30128-RFH, 2006 WL 3658485, at *5 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Dec. 11, 2006),
and In re Ginsberg, 354 B.R. at 646-47, and In re Jones, 352 B.R. at 823, and In re Wilson, 346 B.R. 59, 64
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 2006), and In re Racette, 343 BR. 200, 202 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 2006), and In re Seaman,
340 BR. 698, 707-09 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2006), and In re Taylor, No. 05-35381DM, 2006 WL 4043357, at *2
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. Mar. 9, 2006), and In re Tomco, 339 B.R. 145, 161 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2006), and In re Ross,
338 B.R. 134, 136 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2006) (dismissing case), with Adams v. Finlay, Nos. 06 Civ. 6039(CLB),
2006 WL 3240522, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2006), and In re Elmendorf, 345 B.R. 486, 503 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2006), and In re Thompson, 344 B.R. 899, 905-06 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. 2006), vacated No. 07-1240, 2007 WL
2859795 (7th Cir. Oct. 2, 2007), and In re Carey, 341 B.R. 798, 804 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2006), and In re Rios,
336 B.R. 177, 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005), and In re Hubbard, 333 B.R. 377, 388 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005)
(striking the petition). Cf. In re Burch, No. 06-10228, 2006 WL 3922511, at *1-*4 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Oct. 23,
2006) (dismissing petition, but distinguishing that action from a dismissal of the case under § 707(a)). See
generally Deller & Meriwether, supra note 21 (endorsing dismissal); Joseph Satorius, Note, Strike or Dismiss:
Interpretation of the BAPCPA 109(h) Credit Counseling Requirement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2231 (2007)
(endorsing the striking of petitions); Michael Newman, Comment, BAPCPA "s New Section 109(h) Credit
Counseling Requirement: Is It Having the Effect Congress Intended?, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 489.
129 See, e.g., In re Gaddis, No. 07-40476, 2007 WL 1610783, at *1,*3 (Bankr. D. Kan. June 4, 2007) (186
days); In re Moon, 2007 WL 1087452, at *1-*2 (271 days); In re Ruckdaschel, 364 BR. at 726, 728 (187
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received credit counseling more than forty-five days after the petition was
filed.'
30
But other courts have allowed debtors who filed a petition without the
required pre-filing credit counseling to remain in the bankruptcy court, noting
that the provisions relating to dismissal of bankruptcy cases under § 707'1' and
§ 13 0 7 132 are permissive rather than mandatory. 133 Some courts have endorsed
a six-factor approach to determining whether dismissal is an appropriate
exercise of discretion for failure to satisfy § 109(h):
1. Whether the debtor filed the case in good faith;
2. Whether the debtor took all reasonably steps to comply with the
statutory requirements;
3. Whether the debtor's failure to comply was the result of circumstances
that were both extraordinary and beyond the control of the debtor;
4. Whether the debtor's conduct meets the minimum requirements of 11
U.S.C. § 109(h);
5. Whether any party would be prejudiced by allowing the case to
proceed; and
6. Whether there are any unique equitable factors that tip the balance in
one direction or the other.'
34
days); In re Gaikoski, No. 07-60444, 2007 WL 845876, at *1 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2007) (214 days); In
re Giles, 361 B.R. 212, 213-14 (Bankr. D. Utah 2007) (182 days); In re Jones, 352 B.R. at 814-16 (190 days).
130 See, e.g., Clippard, 365 B.R. 131. But cf. In re Curington, 2005 WL 3752229, at *6 (debtors received
credit counseling forty-four days after filing, but did not get court approval for deferral).
131 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) (2000) ("The court may dismiss a case under this chapter only after notice and a
hearing and only for cause ... ").
132 I1 U.S.C.A. § 1307(c) (West 2007) ("Except as provided in subsection (e) of this section [dealing with
the failure of the debtor to file a tax return under section 1308], on request of a party in interest or the United
States trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may . . . dismiss a case under this chapter . . . for
cause ... ").
133 See, e.g., In re Henderson, 364 B.R. 906, 912 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2007); In re Nichols, 362 B.R. 88, 93
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Keman, 358 B.R. 537, 538-39 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2007); In re Hess, 347 B.R.
489, 498 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2006); In re Bricksin, 346 B.R. 497, 502-03 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2006); In re Bass, No.
06-21011 -L, 2006 WL 1593978 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. June 9, 2006), rev'd sub nor. Clippard v. Bass, 365 B.R.
131 (W.D. Tenn. 2007).
134 See In re Hess, 347 B.R. at 498. See also In re Henderson, 364 B.R. at 913; In re Nichols, 362 B.R. at
94. Cf. In re Dillard, No. 06-30128-RFH, 2006 WL 3658485, at *3 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. Dec. It, 2006)
(assuming that the Hess factors are correct, debtor failed to demonstrate that case should not be dismissed).
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Another court has suggested that the following three factors are relevant in
determining whether to dismiss a case based on noncompliance with the credit
counseling requirement:
1. The debtor has a reasonable explanation for not participating in budget
and credit counseling within 180 days prior to filing a bankruptcy
petition;
2. The debtor participates in budget and credit counseling once the debtor
learns that it is necessary; and
3. At the budget and credit counseling session, it is determined that the
individual's debts could not have been paid outside of bankruptcy. 1
35
Leading bankruptcy commentators have endorsed judicial discretion to
waive the pre-filing credit counseling requirement, at least when the debtor has
submitted an unsatisfactory certification in good faith and no other party has
moved to dismiss the case. 36
Nevertheless, even the courts that have exercised their perceived discretion
to refuse to dismiss or strike a bankruptcy petition based on noncompliance
with the pre-filing credit counseling requirement have only done so when the
credit counseling actually occurred, although not on a timely basis.' 37  No
135 In re Manalad, 360 B.R. 288, 308 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2007). See also In re Enloe, 373 B.R. 123, 132
(Bankr. D. Colo. 2007).
136 2 COLLIER, supra note 40, 109.09[3], 109-60. In discussing the limited nature of the permanent
exception to the requirement, they noted that, "in view of the serious consequences of dismissal, the court
should find a way to allow a good faith case to proceed despite this nonjurisdictional defect." Id. at 109[4],
109-62.
137 See, e.g., In re Meza, No. 2:06cvI307MCE, 2007 WL 1821416 (E.D. Cal. June 25, 2007), (debtor
received credit counseling from agency five months prior to enactment of BAPCPA and made payments
pursuant to plan for one year thereafter, filing one month after terminating the program); In re Henderson, 364
B.R. at 906 (husband's credit counseling occurred one day after filing, and wife given forty-five days to get
credit counseling); In re Nichols, 362 B.R. at 88 (debtors received credit counseling the same day as filing and
no certificate was filed with petition because counsel thought debtor had forty-five days after filing to
complete the counseling and file the certificate.); In re Manalad, 360 B.R. at 291-92, 297 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2007) (debtor participated in credit counseling session seven months after filing when ordered to do so before
chapter 13 confirmation hearing); In re Bass, 2006 WL 1593978, at *1, *5 (pro se debtor received credit
counseling more than forty-five days after filing, after being unable to attend earlier session due to lack of
transportation); In re Kernan, 358 B.R. at 538, 540 (prior to filing debtor obtained credit counseling that did
not comply with § 109(h) and, when she discovered the problem, obtained approved credit counseling that did
comply and filed her certificate one day after filing); In re Hess, 347 B.R. at 492-93, 501 (one debtor received
counseling from an agency that was not approved at the time and obtained counseling post-filing from an
approved agency; second debtor's petition was erroneously filed by lawyer's office before counseling was
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court has refused to strike or dismiss a petition filed by an inmate who failed to
comply with the pre-filing credit counseling requirements and failed to meet
the requirements for a permanent exception.
CONCLUSION
There is no reason to believe that prisoners as a class are in less need of
bankruptcy protection than the public in general. Certainly Congress has never
chosen explicitly to deny inmates the right to file a bankruptcy case. 138 Section
523(a)(17) 139 expressly acknowledges that a debtor may be a prisoner, 140 and
the amendment made to that provision by the BAPCPA would be inconsistent
with any congressional intention to preclude prisoners from filing for
bankruptcy by other provisions of the BAPCPA. 141 Indeed, although there is
no constitutional right to obtain a discharge through bankruptcy, 142 denying
inmates the right to file for bankruptcy might be viewed as a violation of their
due process right of access to the courts, 143 or their right to equal protection of
the laws. 144
completed ); In re Bricksin, 346 B.R. at 499, 503 (debtors received credit counseling, adhered to a payment
plan for nine months, and then filed for bankruptcy four months later).
131 See 11 § U.S.C. 109 (2000).
131 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(17) (West 2007).
140 Section 523(a)(17) excepts from discharge any debt:
for a fee imposed on a prisoner by any court for the filing of a case, motion, complaint, or appeal,
or for other costs and expenses assessed with respect to such filing, regardless of an assertion of
poverty by the debtor under subsection (b) or (f)(2) of section 1915 of title 28 (or a similar non-
Federal law), or the debtor's status as a prisoner, as defined in section 1915(h) of title 28 (or a
similar non-Federal law).
Id.
141 BAPCPA § 301(l) replaced the phrase "by a court" with the phrase "on a prisoner by any court" in
523(a)(17). Pub. L. No. 109-8, § 301(1), 119 Stat. 23 (2005).
142 See, e.g., United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973); In re Stewart, 175 F.3d 796, 812 (10th
Cir. 1999); Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown v. Commonwealth of Pa., Dep't of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred
Heart Hosp. of Norristown), 133 F.3d 237, 245 (3d Cir. 1998); In re Krohn, 886 F.2d 123, 127 (6th Cir. 1989).
143 Cf. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81 (1971) (ruling that states cannot constitutionally
deprive indigents of access to the courts for the purpose of securing a divorce); Thompson v. Bond, 421 F.
Supp. 878, 882 (W.D. Mo. 1976) (finding the Missouri civil death statute, which barred prisoners from filing
any civil action other than one challenging validity or constitutionality of confinement, denied inmates
reasonable access to the courts).
144 Cf. Mason v. Granholm, No. 05-73943, 2007 WL 201008 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2007) (amendment to
state's statute preventing discrimination in public services to exclude individuals serving a sentence of
imprisonment violated Constitution's guarantee of equal protection). Foreclosing access to a bankruptcy court
is very different from the fee requirements of the Prison Litigation Reform Act that make filing more costly for
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During the twelve month period ending June 30, 2006, there were
1,453,008 non-business bankruptcy filings. 145  During the same period, the
state and federal prison inmate population grew to 1,556,518.146 This is the
equivalent of 497 inmates for every 100,000 U.S. residents. 147 If one includes
those U.S. residents in jail as well as those in prison, one in every 133 U.S.
residents was incarcerated on June 30, 2006.148 4.8% of all black men in the
U.S. population, 1.9% of all Hispanic men, and 0.7% of all white men were in
custody at that date. 149  African-Americans are also disproportionately
represented in bankruptcy.' 
50
In 1997, the last year for which such information was disseminated, 30.4%
of federal inmates and 16.6% of state inmates were married. 151  Although
almost 60% of bankruptcy petitions are filed by married debtors,' 52 a higher
proportion of individuals who are single or divorced file for bankruptcy than
those who are married. 153 Approximately 63% of federal prisoners and 55.4%
of state prisoners were parents of minor children.' 54 By 1999, 1.5 million U.S.
children had a parent in federal or state prison.' 55 Of the parents in federal
prison, only 36% currently were married; 38% had never been married. 156 For
those parents in state prison, only 23% currently were married and 48% had
never been married. 1
57
prisoners. Such provisions have been upheld against constitutional challenges. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hobbs,
106 F.3d 1281, 1284 (6th Cir. 1997).
145 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, August 28, 2006 Table F-2 (3 Months Period), http://www.
uscourts.gov/PressReleases/archive2006.html.
146 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NCJ
217675, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2006 2 (2007), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/pjimO6.pdf.
147 id.
148 Id. at 8.
149 id. at 1.
150 See TERESA A. SULLIVAN ET AL., THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS 46 (Yale University Press 2000).
151 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NCJ
177613, CORRECrIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 1997 48, tbl. 4.1 (2000), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpus9704.pdf.
152 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 37.
153 Id. at 183.
154 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN NCJ
182335, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN 1 (2000), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/iptc.pdf.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 3.
157 id.
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Bankruptcy filers are less likely than the national population to have
obtained a college degree.' 58 The median education level for both groups was
12 years, with only 9.1% of federal inmates and 2.7% of state inmates having
graduated from college.' 59 Debtors are, not surprisingly, also concentrated in
the lower portion of the income distribution scale.' About 36% of all jail
inmates were unemployed before their arrest, and almost half reported income
of less than $600 a month. 16 1 Only 13.5% of jail inmates had personal income
of $2,000 a month or more.' 62 About 22% of jail inmates reported receiving
some sort of financial assistance from the government, such as welfare, Aid to
Families with Dependant Children, and food stamps.
163
Inmates also suffer from physical or mental disabilities at a
disproportionate rate. In 1997, 31% of state inmates and 23.4% of federal
inmates reported having a learning or speech disability, a hearing or vision
problem, or a mental or physical impairment.' 64 The rates were even higher
among those inmates who were unemployed before their arrest. 165 By mid-
year 2005, it was reported that "more than half of all prison and jail inmates
had a mental health problem. ' 66  Medical problems are one of the major
reasons for bankruptcy filings.' 
67
Consumer bankruptcy has been shown to be attributable to higher than
normal ratios of debt to family income.' 68  Compared to non-incarcerated
debtors, 169 prison inmates are unemployed in higher numbers prior to their
imprisonment, and when they are employed, they make significantly less
158 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 54.
159 CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 151, at 48, tbl. 4.1.
160 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 61.
161 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT NCJ 164620, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES 1996 3-4 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
pub/pdf/pji96.pdf.
162 Id. at 4.
163 id.
164 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT NCJ 181644, MEDICAL PROBLEMS OF INMATES 1997 1 (2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/mpi97.pdf.
165 Id. at 9.
166 U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SPECIAL
REPORT NCJ 213600, MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at http://
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
167 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 144.
168 See TERESA SULLIVAN ET AL., AS WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS 76-77 (Oxford University Press 1989).
169 See id. at 86 (estimating that "between 83% and 93% of... debtors [are] employed at the time they
file for bankruptcy").
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money. Prisoners are not able to work to support themselves and their families
during their incarceration. Yet their debt, such as car payments, mortgage
obligations, and child support, continues to accrue, increasing their debt-to-
income ratio. Indeed, some states may seek reimbursement for the cost of the
inmate's incarceration adding to his debt burden.
1 70
The impact of that debt on the inmate and his or her family can be
devastating. Closing the bankruptcy court to a prisoner may result in the loss
of a home or car, and reliance on public social services to care for his or her
dependants. The incarceration of a loved one already places inordinate strain
on a relationship, causing many couples divorce or otherwise separate.
17
'
Marital disruption is itself a significant cause of financial collapse in a
family. 72 The innocent spouse and children can end up the real losers when an
inmate is denied the opportunity to obtain a discharge of his or her debts. The
societal costs of these indirect losses can far exceed the direct loss to creditors
of the incarcerated would-be debtor.
No one is suggesting that inmates do not deserve the punishment that they
have been sentenced, or that bankruptcy courts should become a haven for
prisoners with too much time on their hands and too little activity to keep them
occupied. But inmates suffer the same financial pressures that others do, and
have at least the same need for discharge from their debts. Judges should not
allow the BAPCPA to be interpreted in a manner that would have the
unintended, and completely unwarranted, consequence of imposing on the
penal population a punishment never contemplated by the criminal laws of this
country, that is, denying them, and their families, relief for their economic
distress. Bankruptcy judges may, through interpretation of the new credit
counseling requirements, and through the exercise of their discretion in ruling
on motions to dismiss based on ineligibility of the debtor, avoid turning the
twenty-first century prison into the financial cesspools of the debtors' prisons
of Dickens's time. Bankruptcy courts should be open to all.
170 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31-238 (2007); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/3-7-6 (2007); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 532.352 (2007); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 800.401-406 (West 2007).; Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 217.825-841 (West 2007).
171 See Elise Zealand, Note, Protecting the Ties that Bind from Behind Bars: A Call for Equal
Opportunities for Incarcerated Fathers and Their Children to Maintain the Parent-Child Relationship, 31
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 247, 254 (Winter 1998).
172 See SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 181.
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